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I.

ARGUMENT

Hames stand on the arguments in their opening brief with respect to the arguments
advanced by Grease Spot on part A of its argument on whether Hames are entitled to recover
attorney fees incurred in arbitration. Hames therefore focus in this brief on the argument
raised by Grease Spot in part B whether Hames are entitled to attorney fees incurred before
and after arbitration.
1.

The standard of review.
Grease Spot correctly notes that the determination of who is the prevailing party is

within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of
that discretion. 11-ilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119,
1122 (2007), citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 568, 836 P.2d
511,514 (1992).
The abuse of discretion analysis is well established.
When examining whether a trial court abused its discretion,
this Court considers:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of this discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.
Id. [Farm Credit, 122 Idaho at 568, 836 P.2d at 514]
(citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho
87,803 P.2d 993 (1991)).

1

frilogy Network, 144 Idaho at 847; 172 P.3d at 1122.

2.

Grease Spot argues that the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion by

determining that the only issue on which Harnes prevailed at the trial court was the issue
compelling arbitration. R., p. 80. The trial court went on to explain its ruling that the only
issue on which Hames prevailed in the trial court was the issue of compelling arbitration.
Because of the Judgment entered dismissing the
Complaint of the Grease Spot on the merits, the Court holds that
the judgment entered herein is not inconsistent with its findings
that Harnes prevailed on the issue of compelling arbitration.
The Court expresses no opinion as to whether Harnes would be
entitled to Fees and costs if the Grease Spot had obtained a
money judgment against Harnes pursuant to arbitration award
confirmation proceedings. It may very well be that the ultimate
resolution on the merits by the arbitrator should be irrelevant,
but this is not an issue this Court needs to decide.
R., p. 81.
It is true that who prevails on the claims pled does not necessarily decide the question

of prevailing party. For example, in Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 476-77, 181 P.3d
473 (2008), the trial court had enforced a settlement agreement reached at mediation and
declared the party seeking to enforce the settlement agreement to be the prevailing party. The
plaintiff had not pled the breach of the settlement agreement as a claim, but sought to enforce
the settlement agreement that resolved the claim. The trial court determined, considering the
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(b)1 that the plaintiff was the prevailing party and

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) provides: Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an
action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion
2

awarded the plaintiff its attorney fees limited to its fees and costs incurred in enforcing the
settlement agreement. The settlement agreement contained an attorney fee provision. This
court held, citing Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,625, 151 P.3d 818,821 (2007) that the
settlement agreement superseded and extinguished all pre-existing claims the parties intended
to settle. Therefore who prevailed on the question of the enforcement of the settlement
agreement properly determined who qualified as the prevailing party.
That situation is different from the one in this case, as the settlement agreement
superseded the claims pled.

The motion to compel arbitration did not supersede the

pleadings or transmute the dispute into something other than a claim over a commercial
transaction. It merely changed the forum in which the dispute was decided.
The cases are few and far between in which the appellate courts of Idaho have found
an abuse of discretion in determining the prevailing party, but there are limits. In Platt v.
Brown, 120 Idaho 41, 813 P.2d 380 (Ct.App. 1991), the Court determined that the trial court

had abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees against a defendant in a quiet title action
who had been named solely because she was included in the chain of title and who had been
dismissed on the first day of trial by stipulation of the parties. On that same day the parties

consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of
the issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.

3

stipulated to quiet title to the property in the plaintiff. The trial then proceeded on a claim for
fraud against the co-defendant. After the trial court awarded the plaintiff its costs incurred in
bringing the action and exemplary damages against the co-defendant, the trial court modified
its award on the motion of the co-defendant removing the exemplary damages but awarding
costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff and against the co-defendant.

Even though the

complaint prayed for attorney fees only against the co-defendant the plaintiff submitted an
amended judgment awarding the plaintiff attorney fees and costs against "the defendants."
This judgment was entered, despite findings and conclusions prepared by the trial court that
formed the basis of the amended judgment, which made no mention of the defendant who
had been dismissed on the day of trial. The plaintiff subsequently obtained execution against
the dismissed defendant.
The Court held that because the trial court made no findings showing that the
dismissed defendant was entitled to attorney fees, the entry of judgment against the dismissed
defendant was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiff named
the dismissed defendant in the quiet title action without alleging any acts of wrongdoing on
her part.

The plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of the defendant from the action without

making any claim against her for costs or fees. The Court of Appeals determined that on
these facts the plaintiff could not be a prevailing party against the dismissed defendant and
the dismissed defendant's defense was as a matter oflaw not frivolous.
The trial court in this case apparently concluded that the arbitration award was

4

irrelevant to the determination of the prevailing party, stating, "Since this matter went into
arbitration, a court would have to refer to the arbitration proceeding itself to conduct an
analysis of the prevailing party." R., p. 80. However, the trial court used the arbitration
award to confirm the award and enter judgment. R., p. 51-52. The trial court characterized
this as a dismissal of the action. R., p. 81.

In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117
P.3d 130 (2005) this Court considered language from Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho
687,682 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.1984), "Mere dismissal of a claim without trial does not
necessarily mean that the party against whom the claim was made is a prevailing party for the
purpose of awarding costs and fees." The trial court had observed in determining that no
party was the prevailing party that defendant Nord Excavating was dismissed after a motion
for directed verdict and the jury had awarded Nord Excavating less than a tenth of the
damages it was seeking in its counterclaim. This Court noted that the trial court "did not
mention the outcome in Reed's and Nord Excavating's favor as defendants, and wrote that
'[t]aking into consideration the claims, counterclaims and damages alleged and recovered by
the parties, neither of the 'parties' prevailed in this case."'
Because Nord Excavating had been dismissed on directed verdict and had prevailed in
its counterclaim, viewing its success "from an overall standpoint" this Court had no trouble
determining that Nord Excavating was a prevailing party. This court reasoned:
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord
Excavating was a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the

5

district court focused too much attention on the Company's less
than tremendous success on its counterclaim and seemingly
ignored the fact that the Company avoided all liability as a
defendant. The district court improperly undervalued the
Company's successful defense. Avoiding liability is a significant
benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk is as
good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In
litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as
winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while
a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more exalted
than a defendant who simply walks out of court no worse for the
wear, courts must not ignore the value of a successful defense.
In this case, logic suggests that a verdict in Nord Excavating's
favor and a victory on its counterclaim (albeit, a relatively small
one), by definition, makes it a prevailing party.
Eighteen Mile Ranch, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. In this case, just as in Eighteen
Mile Ranch the defendants Harnes left the civil litigation with "the most favorable outcome

that could possibly be achieved." Id., quoting from Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports,
134 Idaho 259,262, 999 P.2d 914,919 (Ct.App.2000).
As a matter of law, Harnes were the prevailing party and the trial court's
characterization of Harnes as the prevailing party only in their successful attempt to compel
arbitration is just inconsistent with the relief obtained by Harnes and was an abuse of
discretion.
Grease Spot argnes that the dispute over the "commercial transaction" was resolved
by the arbitrator's Memorandum Decision; therefore, all activity in the civil litigation after
the arbitrator's award consisted solely of the Harnes' "quest" for "post judgment attorney
fees." Grease Spot argues that "post judgment attorney fees are awardable only with respect
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to attempts to collect on a judgment."
Grease Spot's analysis ignores the law. An arbitrator's award is not self-executing. It
must be confirmed by the trial court and reduced to a judgment to be enforceable. Idaho
Code§§ 7-91 !, 7-914. In no-wise does an arbitrator's award constitute a judgment.
Grease Spot also quarrels without citation to authority that attorney fees incurred in
pursuing attorney fees are not recoverable. Grease Spot's citation to Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127
Idaho 262, 899 P.2d 972 (1995) is inapposite, as it does not stand for the proposition that the
Hames are not entitled to attorney fees in obtaining judgment. Grease Spot ignores that there
are independent bases for an award of attorney fees to the Hames, Idaho Code § 12-120(3)
and Idaho Code§ 9-714, which were not available to the prevailing party in Kaelker.
To be sure Idaho Code § 9-714 does by use of the word "may" impart discretion to the
trial court, but no more so than does I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 80
P.3d I 024 (2003), cited by both parties in this case, involved protracted confirmation
challenges that the trial court in that case found non-meritorious. Driver does not require,
however, that the party against whom confirmation is sought and judgment is entered must
take a non-meritorious position in order for the prevailing party to qualify for an attorney fee
award based on Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) or Idaho Code§ 9-714. Deerstra v. Hagler, 145
Idaho 922, 188 P.3d 864 (2008).

II.

CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, Hames are the prevailing parties in the civil litigation despite the
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referral of the matter to arbitration based on the Harnes' motion over the objection of Grease
Spot. Harnes are at a minimum entitled to their attorney fees before and after the referral to
arbitration. As said in the opening appellants' brief, Hames are entitled to their attorney fees
incurred in the arbitration, too. Hames ask this court to reverse the decision of the trial court
limiting their status as prevailing party only to the issue of compelling arbitration and remand to
the trial court with directions to award attorney fees incurred in arbitration and to reconsider the
question of attorney fees incurred before and after arbitration based on Deerstra.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

d._ day of November, 2008.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

~1/»LfL_

Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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Michael B. Hague
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Michael E. Ramsden
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